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Abstract
The political left turn in Latin America, which lagged its transition to liberal-
ized market economies by a decade or more, challenges conventional economic
explanations of voting behavior. This paper generalizes the forward-looking
voter model to a broad range of dynamic, possibly non-concave income pro-
cesses. Under full information, the model implies support for redistributive
policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present. In
contrast, modeling voters’ evolving beliefs about an unknown income dynamic
process shows a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences. Sim-
ulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that this imperfect information
perspective accounts for Latin America’s right-to-left political shift, and offers
additional insights about political dynamics in the face of economic polarization.
Keywords: Income dynamics, redistributive politics, polarization, Bayesian learning,
Latin America.
1. Introduction
Most Latin American countries had transitioned to market economies by the
early 1990’s. The largely center-right political leadership that instituted these
transitions continued to win national elections and persisted in into the early
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2000’s. After that, electoral politics turned sharply left. Presidential elections
saw left-leaning candidates defeat more conservative opponents in Brazil, Bo-
livia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela.1 Not only did these elections usher in a political shift, but in many
instances they were tightly contested contested between candidates offering fun-
damentally different economic visions. The goal of this paper is to provide a
theoretical framework to help us understand the economic forces that underlie
this political dynamic.
We start from the perspective that by the early 1990s, Latin America and
other, what are now called, transitional economies, experienced the exhaustion
of (left) political alternatives. In Peru, for example, the 1980s ended with hyper-
inflation and a general economic malaise that had been overseen by a left-of-
center government. Our goal in this paper is not to explain the rightward shift
from the interventionist, putatively left-wing policies of the 1980s, but instead
to explain the subsequent return to left-leaning governments following a decade
or more of conservative, economically liberal rule.
The influential body of political economy literature that focuses on economic
inequality as a force that determines both political institutions and voting pat-
terns would seem to offer a window into this right to left shift Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006); Boix (2003). However, the fact that inequality measures tend
to be remarkably stable over time makes it unlikely that inequality can ex-
plain Latin America’s right-left voting dynamics. Robert Kaufman Kaufman
(2009) confirms the inconvenient empirical fact that contemporaneous measures
of economic inequality do a very poor job of explaining political institutions and
voting patterns in Latin America.2
Although we could abandon the search for economic explanations of contem-
porary voting patterns, we instead take our cue from Benabou and Ok (2001)
and Moene and Wallerstein (2001) who model voters as forward-looking agents
who look beyond current income inequality and focus on how policies will in-
fluence their future economic prospects. From this starting point, we offer the
following contributions:
• We analyze forward-looking political preferences under a variety of income
dynamics, including dynamics that offer prospects for upward mobility
(‘POUM’ as in Benabou and Ok), as well as empirically based dynamics
which are neither concave or convex that offer no prospects of upward
mobility (‘No-POUM’).
1While the contemporary Latin American left cannot be defined by a single, shared eco-
nomic model, this new left does share an impulse and desire to shift resources and opportunity
to those at the bottom of the income distribution. For instance, Greene and Baker (2011)
construct vote revealed leftism (VRL) from ideological ratings of presidents and parliamen-
tary parties in Latin America from 1996-2008, showing that the left has an economic policy
mandate to halt or partially reverse neoliberal economic policies.
2Fields (2007) makes this point even more strongly by showing how inequality can increase
during the early stages of a period of upward mobility that would dampen political preferences
for redistribution.
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• We also consider political dynamics when voters lack full information and
must live and learn about the income dynamics that characterize their
economy. This is particularly relevant to transition countries that have
fundamentally altered their economic model, as happened across Latin
America circa 1990.
• We show that not only does the incorporation of learning provide a richer
suite of possible political dynamics, it also reveals that perceptions of the
dead weight loss associated with redistribution can, in surprising ways,
further fuel political instability.
• To draw out the implications of our model, we estimate income distri-
bution dynamics for two Latin American countries, Chile and Peru, and
show that the learning, forward-looking voter model is broadly consistent
with the recent political histories of both countries.
In their seminal paper, Benabou and Ok show that concave income distribution
dynamics that offer the prospect of upward mobility can account for surprising
conservatism by voters below the mean income who would benefit in the short
run from redistributive policies.3 While this POUMmodel has little to say about
the right-left political dynamics observed in contemporary Latin America, we
show here that the income transition functions suggested by poverty trap theory,
which offer limited or no prospects of upward mobility can result in a surpris-
ingly and increasingly pro-redistribution electorate.4 Specifically, we show that
forward-looking political preferences are determined by the smoothed envelopes
drawn around income transition functions, where the transitions themselves
need not be concave or convex. This finding generalizes the connection between
redistribution and income beyond the usual concepts in the literature.
In an effort to corroborate this theoretical intuition, we calibrate income
dynamics for Latin American countries. These reveal for some countries the
sort of No-POUM dynamics that would be expected to generate an increas-
ingly pro-redistribution electorate. Applying these dynamics to a full informa-
tion, forward-looking voting model indicates that the demand for redistribution
should have been stronger and should have occurred well in advance of the suite
of Latin American presidential elections that moved governments to the left
in the early 2000’s. This result presents a puzzle that questions fundamental
assumptions about how economic voters perceive and react to their material
prospects.
3Complementary endogenous explanations for anti-redistributive positions include disin-
centives for labor supply Meltzer and Richards (1981), asset formation Persson and Tabellini
(1994), inefficient levels of public goods Alesina and Rodrik (1994), multidimensional policy
spaces in which non-economic preferences conflict with pocketbook voting Roemer (2001). To
highlight the roles of income dynamics and learning, we ignore the incentive effects of taxation
(see Piketty (1995)), but do account for the role of dead weight loss.
4Tucker (2006) shows that voting in the post-Soviet bloc reflects economic experiences:
areas with poor outcomes support “Old Regime” parties while good outcomes provide support
for liberal “New Regime” parties.
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We argue it is the assumption that voters have full information about their
economy’s income distribution dynamics that is most problematic, especially in
transition economies where the electorates have had little prior experience with
liberalized market economies (e.g. Przeworski, 1991).5 In such circumstances,
voters have little choice but to fall back on priors about how such an economy
might work.6 Edwards (1995), for example, largely credits the origins of the
switch to liberal economic policies within Latin America to the failure of all
other alternatives, although he notes that multilateral institutions influenced
the “convergence of doctrinal views” through research, analysis, lending practices
and conditionalities.
In Latin America, the shift to the liberal economic model was put forward
on the grounds that it would boost incomes and well being for all, including the
lower half of the income distribution.7 Assuming that voters begin with this
“POUM prior,” we go on to model voters as Bayesian learners who experientially
update their expectations based on their own stochastic income experience.
Leveraging the POUM and No-POUM distinction, we characterize “right” vs
“left” Bayesian beliefs about income dynamics. We show that this model of
forward-looking, Bayesian voters offers an empirically tenable explanation of the
recent right to left political evolution in Latin America. We further show–under
more restrictive assumptions–that taking into consideration the dead weight
losses of redistribution amplifies this result and implies even stronger political
volatility. While increased dead weight loss reduces support for redistribution
for both right and left voters, the effect is proportionately stronger for right
voters. This asymmetry then amplifies political volatility in which learning is
moving some fraction of the electorate left.
The general tenor of this explanation is corroborated by public opinion sur-
vey data from Peru, a country whose politics mirror the right to left electoral
pattern that motivates this paper. The Latinobarómetro Corporation began
annual surveys of the Peruvian electorate in 1995, the year in which liberal can-
didate Alberto Fujimori was elected with a strong two-thirds majority.8 The
1995 data reveal that 55% of Peruvian expressed prospects of upward mobil-
ity, expecting their personal economic circumstances to improve in the next 12
months.9 At the same time, only 11% of survey respondents positioned them-
5Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) point out the importance of uncertainty in policy reform,
although they explain why policies might increase in popularity after implementation, rather
than decrease as in Latin America. Van Wijnbergen and Willems (2012) extend their approach
with learning dynamics to explain why policies may decrease in popularity.
6Roemer (1994) models this process in a Downsian framework. In contrast, this paper
conceptualizes beliefs about empirically based income dynamics as an ‘ideology space’ which
voters learn about through personal experience.
7See Williamson (1990) for a classic statement of the so-called Washington Consensus
about the desirability of liberal economic policies for Latin America.
8Fujimori was first elected in 1990 as a progressive alternative to an economically more
liberal candidate. Once elected, Fujimori moved sharply right, dissolved his own constitutional
presidency and installed himself as de facto president through his “auto-golpe” in 1992, and
was then re-elected in 1995 as the liberal candidate.
9The Latinobarómetro specifically questions respondents about perceived past and ex-
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selves as left of center on a political scale, while another 23% said that they
were either uncertain of their political position, or refused to reveal it. In the
ensuing 5 years, the fraction of the electorate expressing positive prospects of
upward mobility steadily declined from 55%, reaching a low of 27% in 1998,
before rebounding to 36% in the months before the 2000 presidential election.
Over this same time period, the fraction of the electorate who self-identified
as left of center doubled to 22%, a trend that continued another 5 years when
the self-identified left reached 33% of the electorate. Fujimori won the 2000
election, which was widely criticized as fraudulent, and then exiled himself from
Peru later that year, to be replaced in 2001 by the more progressive candidate
he had ostensibly defeated in the 2000 election.
While Peru fits the pattern whereby diminished expectations of upward mo-
bility accompany a leftward shift in the electorate, observers of transition econ-
omy politics have noted similar patterns elsewhere. Weyland (2002), for ex-
ample, notes that support for the liberal economic policies introduced in Latin
America the late 1980s and early 1990s waned over time, especially as individu-
als began to learn and reassess their future prospects.10 Similarly, Graham and
Pettinato’s (2002) analysis of Peru and Russia identifies a numerically signifi-
cant group of “frustrated achievers,” who benefited initially from liberal reforms,
but came to see little prospect for further advance. These authors go on to note
that this frustrated group showed waning support for market-oriented policies
and speculate that their political behavior will likely change accordingly.11
Finally, evidence for the role of upward mobility in voting behavior has been
mixed, and the reach of the income based approach can be extended by model-
ing more general income dynamics. Fong (2001) finds that variables reflecting
personal benefit from redistribution are insignificant in predicting redistributive
preferences in the US. On the other hand, Checchi and Filippin (2004) find
experimental support that the POUM reduces chosen taxation rates and that
pected future changes in their “economic situation.” Whether individuals report changes
based on their absolute or relative living standards is not clear from the wording of this ques-
tion. Graham and Pettinato (2002) find that with the exception of the poorest cohort of
respondents, individuals’ perceptions of changes in their economic circumstances are influ-
enced by their relative position in the income distribution, not absolute changes in their living
standards.
10While documenting the same shift in policy and electoral preferences that motivate our
work, Weyland (2002) offers a rather different explanation rooted in cumulative prospect
theory. Whereas we emphasize learning about income distribution dynamics under the new
economic regime, Weyland suggests that voters’ subjective preferences changed as they become
more risk averse–and safety net-loving–after an initial period in which they were willing to
take the risk of neo-liberal shock therapy.
11Another possible explanation is that voters were disappointed in the aggregate growth
performance achieved under the new regime and hence shifted to the other party. It is also
of course possible that people are fooled, or fool themselves, about the nature of income dy-
namics and vote against their true economic interests. Survey research which assesses voter’s
subjective expectations about prospects has found “POUM captures hopes and expectations
as well as realistic socioeconomic assessments” Graham and Pettinato (2002). Additional pos-
sibilities are considered by Putterman (1996). Herrera (2005) carefully studies how economic
information was mediated by larger sets of social relations in post-USSR Russia.
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longer time horizons tend to decrease chosen rates under POUM. Beckman and
Zheng (2007) find tentative support for the POUM hypothesis using undergrad-
uate surveys. At the international level, Wong (2004) examines the GSS and
World Values Survey for redistributive preferences and finds the expected signs
across incomes, but no evidence of the “tipping behavior” implied by median
voter or POUM models.
There may of course be alternative explanations of the leftward shift of elec-
torates and policy in transition economies. Callander (2011), for example, puts
forward a model of pragmatic policy experimentation in which a single leader,
with unchanging preferences, may alter a policy parameter as she learns about a
complex mapping from the parameter to a univariate outcome measure (e.g., en-
vironmental quality). While one can indeed observe such policy tinkering within
regimes in transition economies, the policy experimentation approach does not
accord well with the regime changes and the vitriolic electoral processes that
accompanied the left-right shift in Latin America circa 2000.12 Broadly similar
to Callander (2011), Buera et al. (2011) examine policymakers as passive sta-
tistical learners who learn from policy mutations in neighboring countries. In
contrast, our model provides a microfoundation for the electoral discontent that
is a first or structural mover of fundamental policy change.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a
basic framework for individual and aggregate income dynamics in the presence of
transient shocks, and models political support for redistributive policies by both
myopic and forward-looking voters who enjoy full information about the income
dynamic process. Section 3 then introduces both concave (POUM) and poverty
trap (No-POUM) dynamics, and derives results on the political preferences of
forward-looking voters who may be fully informed or instead must learn about
extant income dynamics through experience. The analysis of Section 3 is applied
to Latin American income dynamics in Section 4. Section 5 shows this model
of forward-looking Bayesian voters who confront a No-POUM world can give
rise to the political polarization and the sudden political shifts that have been
observed in twenty first century Latin America. Section 6 concludes.
2. Forward-looking Voters and the Demand for Redistribution
This section lays out machinery needed to discuss changing patterns in vot-
ing when the electorate can choose among income redistribution schemes. We
assume a continuum of voters whose incomes evolve over time and fluctuate
with idiosyncratic shocks each period. Voters care only about maximizing the
present discounted value of income from all sources, whether public or private,
and are thus “pocketbook voters.” We define the demand for redistribution as
12In contrast to the Callander (2011) focus on policy complexity, we focus on voters who
care about their individual incomes and are trying to figure out the laissez faire counterfactual
for themselves (“will I be better off in 4 years?” to the quote the challenge that US president
Reagan put to voters).
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the fraction of voters who rationally prefer redistribution from a pocketbook
perspective.
In order to evaluate a particular redistributive policy, each voter consid-
ers three things: their individual income path, the aggregate income path of
the economy and the longevity of the policy. Changes in the economy over
time can thereby induce changes in voting patterns, and support for a given
policy is dependent on expected economic conditions. To help unpack these
relationships, this section defines income transitions, redistributive schemes and
forward-looking demand for redistribution. After developing baseline analytical
results, this framework will be extended in the next section to consider the role
of beliefs when income transitions are uncertain.
2.1. Income Transitions
To model the income transition process, we follow the lead of the rich theo-
retical literature on asset accumulation and income distribution dynamics and
assume that at any time period t, individual i’s income is anchored to a struc-
tural component, ysit, that depends on accumulated human capital and other
assets. Realized income is the product of this structural component with a
transitory income shock:
yit = y
s
itεit,
where we assume that εit is distributed iid with E [εit] = 1.
Income transitions are driven by the evolution of the structural component
of income, which we assume evolves according to the transition function13 f
such that structural component of income in period t+ 1 can be written as:
ysit+1 = f(y
s
it),
implying that:
yit+1 = f(y
s
it)εit+1.
This specification is consistent with Deaton’s (1991) canonical model of optimal
savings and accumulation. The Deaton model is essentially a wage labor model,
with expected earnings set by a pre-determined level of human capital. The
only accumulable asset in this model is a buffer stock, which impatient, credit-
constrained agents accumulate in order to smooth consumption in the face of
negative income shocks. In the Deaton model, income shocks would not change
future expected income, as in the transition specification above. Empirically,
this notion of a structural anchor to the income distribution process is supported
by micro studies of both middle and high income economies, which find that
within one to two years, households return to their pre-shock level of earnings.
For example, see the study on poverty spells and income shocks in the US by
Gottschalk (1997) and Card and Blank (2008). Lokshin and Ravallion (2004)
13Formally, by income transition we refer to any positive, strictly increasing and continuous
function defined on a bounded interval of the form [0, B].
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similarly find that income shocks dissipate quickly in Hungry and Russia, as do
Antman and McKenzie (2007) in the case of Mexico.14
Given this specification of the income transition process, we consider now
an economy in which individuals are indexed by i and each person enjoys an
initial non-stochastic income, yi0 = ysi0. The initial income distribution F0
is assumed to be bounded and absolutely continuous with positive support.
These assumptions imply that the expected income path for any individual is
deterministic, since
Eit [yit] = f
(
Eit−1 [yit−1]
)
= f
(
f
(
Eit−2 [yit−2]
))
= f (t) (Ei0 [yi0]) = f
(t) (yi0) ,
while realized income can be written as yit = f (t)(yi0) · it.15
When making decisions about the future, we assume individuals care only
about present discounted income, discounted at rate δ each period. We can
therefore write each individual’s discounted income stream over T periods as:
T∑
t=0
δtyit =
T∑
t=0
δtf (t)(yi0) · it. (Discounted Income Stream) (1)
Since E [it] = 1, expected present discounted income can be seen from (1) to be∑T
t=0 δ
tf (t)(yi0). We now turn to policies which might redistribute this income.
2.2. Myopic Demand for Redistribution
Consider the political preferences of myopic, pocketbook voters whose in-
comes evolve according to a known income transition function f as above. Pock-
etbook voters choose policies which maximize their income, and for simplicity
we assume voters are risk neutral. Following the convention in much of the polit-
ical economy literature (e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000), Roemer (2001)), we
define redistribution schemes composed of a flat tax τ and a lump sum transfer
to all voters. Thus if a tax τ is enacted in period t, each voter i receives income:
(1− τ) · yit + τ · (1−D)µt (2)
14In lower income economies, where substantial numbers of households do not earn wages
but depend on agricultural and other forms of self-employment where earnings area a func-
tion productive assets, it not immediately obvious that the income transition process is un-
affected by shocks. For examples, in models where higher earning entrepreneurial forms of
self-employment require a minimum level of productive assets (e.g., Banerjee and Newman
(1993) and Buera (2009)), too large a shock could push households below that minimum
threshold and threaten to reduce their long-term expected income level. However, it is pre-
cisely in this class of models where households will optimally respond to shocks by cutting
consumption and holding on to assets in order to avoid damaging their long-term income
process (i.e. Sen and Dreze (1989), Zimmerman and Carter (2003) and Carter and Lybbert
(2012)). It is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly investigate the microfoundations
that underlie the income transition function, but our assumptions do accord with the insights
with a number of key dynamic models of optimal savings and accumulation.
15While the individual’s history of realized incomes does not matter for expected future
income, this history will matter when the individual does not know the true nature of the
transition process and must deduce it from his or her own lived experience. The next section
considers ramifications.
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Here µt = E0
[
f (t) (y)
]
denotes the mean income of the population at time t,16
and D ∈ [0, 1] denotes any dead weight loss under the redistributive scheme.17
A myopic voter’s most preferred policy τ∗ must maximize expected income.
Since at any period t′ < t we have
Et′ [(1− τ) · yit + τ · (1−D)µt] = (1− τ) · f (t)(yi0) + τ · (1−D)µt,
either τ∗ = 1 (complete redistribution) or τ∗ = 0 (laissez-faire).
Now consider a majoritarian vote taken between τ = 1 and τ = 0 at the
beginning of period t before idiosyncratic shocks are realized. A myopic voter
i prefers τ = 1 to τ = 0 exactly when E[yit] = f (t)(yi0) ≤ (1 − D)µt, which
means they expect to be below average income, less any dead weight loss. Since
f is strictly increasing, f can be inverted, and all voters with initial incomes
yi0 ≤ f (−t) ((1−D)µt) prefer τ = 1 to τ = 0. The fraction of such voters in the
population is determined by the initial distribution of income F0 to arrive at
Pr (Voter prefers τ = 1)= F0
(
f (−t) ((1−D)µt)
)
(Myopic Demand for Redistribution).
2.3. Forward-looking Demand for Redistribution
Here we follow Benabou and Ok’s framework of forward-looking voters who
consider redistributive policies that last from period 0 through period T . Over
this time frame, define a voter’s discounted income stream under laissez-faire
(τ = 0) as gT (yi0). From Equation (1), gT (yi0) =
∑T
t=0 δ
tf (t) (yi0) and the
average of all voters’ discounted income streams is therefore µT ≡ ∑Tt=0 δtµt.
Complete redistribution (τ = 1) over this period would pay out µT , less any
dead weight loss, giving a discounted income of (1−D)µT . Consequently,
a voter prefers τ = 1 to τ = 0 from periods 0 through T if and only if
gT (yi0) ≤ (1−D)µT . Akin to the myopic case, the share of voters demanding
redistribution is
Pr (Voter prefers τ = 1)= F0
([
gT
]−1 (
(1−D)µT )) (Forward Demand for Redistribution).
This equation shows that the fraction of the population who wants redistri-
bution takes into account discounting and the evolution of income during the
policy.
[
gT
]−1 (
(1−D)µT ) is the forward-looking generalization of the term
f (−t)((1−D)µt) that determines the demand for redistribution in the myopic
voter case. Note that a voter who looks forward only one period (or who con-
siders a policy that will last only one year) has the same preferences as a myopic
voter. The next section develops a method to explore voter dynamics under any
16Hereafter, E0 [·] denotes the expectation at time 0 over initial incomes distributed F0 and
all {it}i,t>0.
17Under perfect information, dead weight loss serves no dynamic role, but will allow us to
quantify the appropriate level of loss that would provide majoritarian support for laissez faire
in highly unequal economics. Under incomplete information, dead weight loss has surprising
implications for volatility, as we discuss in the last section.
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income transition function, a family that is broad enough to encapsulate the pro-
cesses implied by theories of both convergent and divergent income distribution
dynamics.
3. Political Dynamics under Full and Imperfect Information
Initially assuming that voters have full information on the structure of in-
come dynamics, this section first recaps the political implications of concave
income dynamics, which exhibit upward mobility and have been studied in de-
tail by Benabou and Ok (2001). We then consider the political implications
of more complex income dynamics that do not exhibit such convergence (e.g.
Banerjee and Newman (1994)), and fail to be concave or convex. Such NoPOUM
dynamics may fail to offer upward prospects for segments of the population.
In reality, full information is unlikely as income dynamics and the prospects
for mobility are complex and hard to understand, especially in economies which
have fundamentally altered their economic model.18 Later in this section, we
thus relax the full information assumption and consider the behavior of voters
who must learn about the true income dynamics from their own experience,
and cast votes over future policies based on this learning in combination with
ideological priors.19
3.1. Political Dynamics under Prospects of Upward Mobility
The Solow model of neoclassical economic growth relies on an assumption of
diminishing capital returns and implies that poorer nations will tend to catch up
over time, or converge, with the incomes of richer nations.20 When transported
to the individual or microeconomic level, the Solow assumptions imply a process
of convergence among the population of a single country.
Figure 1(a) illustrates a typical income dynamic implied by accumulation
under diminishing returns. Note that this concave transition process, maps
incomes in period t into incomes in period t + 1, implies a unique long term
or steady state income level, y∗, at the point where fp(y) crosses the 45-degree
line. Under this transition process, individuals who begin with incomes below
the steady state level will converge towards it, while those who begin above
the steady state level will drop back towards it. Note that this sort of concave
18This approach to modeling ideology as an idiosyncratic evolving process echoes Bates
et al. (1998) as a means to complement cultural and ideological political theories with rational
choice.
19This specification naturally incorporates the possibility that repression or fear constricted
the political space, leading people to vote differently. In this case, the ideological space can
be modeled as constrained to an ideological spectrum which expands with “political thawing”
and faith in democratic institutions over time. This gradual expansion of publicly admissible
views might also help explain large shifts.
20For an early review of both the theoretical and empirical controversies, see Romer (1994).
A more recent review with a theoretical emphasis is Azariadis and Stachurski (2005). While
the concavity of income transition processes are not necessary for convergence, they are ubiq-
uitous in the theoretical and empirical literature.
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Figure 1: POUM and No-POUM Income Transitions
(a) POUM Income Dynamics (b) No-POUM Income Dynamics
income process offers prospects of upward mobility (POUM) to voters whose
initial income levels are less than the steady state income level.
As shown in Section 2, the fraction of myopic voters who demand redistribu-
tion at time t is F0(f (−t)((1−D)µt)). Whether this increases or decreases over
time depends on f (−t)((1−D)µt). In a POUM world, the global concavity of
f implies (through Jensen’s inequality) the demand for redistribution is always
decreasing over time. Similarly, if voters are forward-looking, the fraction of the
population that wants redistribution monotonically decreases as the duration of
a policy increases. Therefore in a POUM world with forward-looking voters, the
demand for redistribution decreases with time in two senses: as evaluations each
single period and as policy longevity increases. This is the type of behavior that
Benabou and Ok (2001) deduce and discuss, and these two aspects of POUM
redistributive dynamics can be summarized as:
Proposition (POUM Dyanmics). Suppose f is concave. Then:
1. The demand for a single period of redistribution decreases over time.
2. The demand for redistribution over a T period horizon decreases in T .
The obvious twin result which follows from Benabou and Ok is that if income
dynamics are convex, the demand for redistribution increases both over time and
over longer policy periods. However, empirical income dynamics are seldom so
ideal as to satisfy pure concavity or convexity.
3.2. Political Dynamics under (No) Prospects of Upward Mobility
In contrast to Figure 1(a), individuals need not face uniformly decreasing re-
turns in asset accumulation. The increasingly well developed theory of poverty
traps suggests a number of mechanisms that can trap households at low liv-
ing standards (see the reviews in Azariadis and Stachurski (2004), Carter and
Barrett (2006)and Barrett and Carter (2013)). Central to all of these theories
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of poverty traps is exclusion from financial markets. Put differently, if house-
holds have access to loan markets and insurance instruments, then even when
confronted by locally increasing returns to scale and risk, they can successfully
engineer a strategy to obtain the assets needed to jump to a high level equilib-
rium. But absent access to those financial markets, households below a critical
initial asset level may remain stuck in a low level, poverty trap equilibrium.
The result of such poverty trap models is Figure 1(b) which illustrates in-
come transition dynamics with multiple steady states.21 The non-concave in-
come transition function, fn (y), has multiple crossings of the 45-degree line
and admits multiple equilibria: y∗H is the high income steady state; y
∗
L is the
low income steady state. Bifurcation occurs at the unstable equilibrium income
level, yb. Households with incomes in excess of yb will tend toward the high
level equilibrium while those that begin below this critical threshold will head
towards the low level, poverty trap equilibrium, y∗L. This implies no prospect of
upward mobility (No-POUM) for voters below yb. In contrast to an economy
with a concave income transition function, economic polarization will occur and
inequality can deepen when income transitions are governed by a non-concave
function like fn (y).22
The remainder of this section considers any income transition function, al-
lowing for both fp and fn types of income transitions and then derives a general
set of results with political implications. We show that relaxing the assump-
tion of concavity can generate rich pattens in the demand for redistribution.
We then provide a theorem showing how these new income transitions create
both increases and decreases in the demand for redistribution, even when the
transition function is neither globally concave nor convex.
3.3. Demand for Redistribution: What’s in the Envelope?
While voter dynamics under POUM are relatively straightforward, non-
convexities under general income transitions lead to more complex political
dynamics. To better describe this complex process, we connect the changing
demand for redistribution to the upper and lower envelopes of an income dy-
namic. We first define the upper envelope of f , f , as the smallest concave
function everywhere above f . The lower envelope f is defined as the largest
convex function everywhere below f . Both types of envelopes are illustrated in
Figure 2 and defined in Equation (3).23
f (x) ≡ inf{h (x) : h is concave, h ≥ f}, f (x) ≡ sup{h (x) : h is convex, f ≥ h}.
(3)
21For empirical examples see Lybbert et al. (2004) and Adato et al. (2006). Banerjee
and Newman (2000) construct a model of “dynamic institutional change” which implies non-
concave income dynamics and exhibits path dependence.
22Strictly speaking, this non-concave income transition function implies increasing polar-
ization, not necessarily increasing inequality, as Esteban and Ray (1994) discuss.
23This is equivalent to finding the envelope created by tracing all lines which are above, but
do not cross f . In practice, there are several efficient algorithms to construct such envelopes
numerically, e.g. Jarvis (1973).
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Figure 2: Upper and Lower Envelopes
(a) POUM World (b) No-POUM World
Clearly for each y we have f(y) ≥ f(y) ≥ f(y) and necessarily f is concave and
f is convex. Two special cases stand out. When f is concave, f and f coincide.
When f is convex, f and f coincide. Therefore in a POUM world, f = f . We
define the sets of incomes where f and f exactly coincide as YP (as this is the
domain of upward mobility). Similarly define the domain of downward mobility,
YN, as incomes where f and f coincide. The relationship of YP and YN to the
path of redistributive preferences is Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. If µt ∈ YP then the demand for redistribution decreases in
period t relative to period t − 1. Conversely, if µt ∈ YN then the demand for
redistribution increases. We consider µt ∈ YP as the other case is similar. We
want to show that f (−t)(µt) ≥ f (−(t+1))(µt+1). This holds iff µt+1 ≤ f(µt) and
by assumption f(µt) = f(µt). Therefore we are done if we can show µt+1 =∫
f (t+1)dF0 ≤ f(µt). Since f ≤ f we know that
∫
f (t+1)dF0 ≤
∫
f ◦ f (t)dF0
so we need to show
∫
f ◦ f (t)dF0 ≤ f(µt). In fact, this last inequality holds by
Jensen’s inequality since by construction, f is concave.
Proposition 1 says that if the mean income next period µt lies in YP, the
demand for redistribution decreases. Conversely, if µt lies in YN, the demand for
redistribution increases. In this sense, the upper and lower envelopes of f are
natural definitions of Right and Left income transitions based on f (where Right
means a transition function–or belief in a transition function–which implies de-
creasing demand for redistribution over time and Left means the opposite). This
proposition also highlights the differences between POUM and No-POUM in-
come dynamics. In a POUM world, f is concave and equals f so all incomes
(including µt) are in YP. Therefore the demand for redistribution is always
decreasing (Figure 2a). In contrast, a No-POUM income dynamic has both YP
and YN regions. Depending on where µt lies the next period, the demand for
redistribution can either increase or decrease (Figure 2b).
In a No-POUM world, the determination of whether the demand for re-
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distribution is increasing or decreasing depends simultaneously on the current
period, the expected income transition and the initial distribution of income.
Although the demand for redistribution may be directly computed, in general
it is hard to derive a particular path analytically due to its dependence on the
range of possible income distributions. In Appendix AppendixB, we illustrate
this point with a concrete example where for a large class of income dynamics,
small changes in F0 cause qualitative changes in the demand for redistribution
over time.
In a POUM world, the demand for redistribution decreases with policy
length, as discussed above. However, in a No-POUM world, longer policy hori-
zons may include relatively precipitous drops in present discounted income for
some segments of the population. In such cases, policy longevity inspires in-
creased demand for redistribution. The following proposition formalizes this
argument, the key condition being that mean incomes lie in the region of down-
ward mobility, YN, for successive periods.
Proposition 2. Suppose for an income transition f , µt ∈ YN for all periods t.
Then the demand for redistribution increases in policy longevity. Conversely, if
µt ∈ YP for all periods t then demand for redistribution decreases.
Proof. By definition, gT = gT−1 + δT f (T ), so consider the intuitive result (see
appendix):
Lemma 1. Suppose f and g are income transition functions. Then the myopic
demand for redistribution implied by the income transition f + g is between that
implied by f and g.
It is therefore sufficient to show that f (−T ) (µT ) ≥
(
gT−1
)−1 (
E
[
gT−1
])
, or
equivalently
gT−1 ◦ f (−T ) (µT ) ≥ E
[
gT−1
]
. (4)
Now consider that µt ∈ YN for all t implies f−1 (µt) ≥ µt−1 so µt ≥ f (µt−1).
Recursing this equation k times shows
µt ≥ f (k) (µt−k) for all t, k ≥ 0. (5)
Expanding gT−1 ◦ f (−T ) (µT ) and substituting in Equation (5) shows
gT−1 ◦ f (−T ) (µT ) =
T−1∑
t=0
δtf (t−T ) (µT ) ≥
T−1∑
t=0
δtf (t−T ) ◦ f (T−t) (µT−(T−t)) = E [gT−1] .
Which is precisely Equation (4), so demand for redistribution increases. 
3.4. Generalization to stochastic income transitions
While these results are based on a deterministic income transition process,
they generalize to the case in which the income transition function is stochastic
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and drawn from a family of income transition functions {fθ (y)}θ∈Θ, where an
idiosyncratic shock, θit determines the income transition fθit faced each period,
akin to the setting of Proposition 4 of Benabou and Ok (2001).24 The gen-
eralization depends on domains of upward mobility and downward mobility of
the transitions between the expected income transition function for each period,
f˜ (t) (y) ≡ EΘt,...,Θ1 [fθit ◦ . . . ◦ fθi1 (y)] (with f˜ (0) (y) ≡ y ). Define the transi-
tion between period t and period t + 1 as ηt (y) ≡ f˜ (t+1) ◦ f˜ (−t) (y), i.e. for
an individual with initial income y, the change in expected incomes between
period t and t+1. Label the upwardly mobile domains Y˜ tP as where η
t coincides
with its upper envelope and the downwardly mobile domains Y˜ tN as where η
t
coincides with its lower envelope. Then the demand for redistribution changes
with policy longevity as in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3. Under stochastic income transitions, the demand for redistri-
bution will increase in policy longevity when each mean income µt lies in the
domain of downward mobility Y˜ tN for the transition between expected incomes,
ηt. Similarly, the demand for redistribution decreases if each mean income lies
in the domain of upward mobility Y˜ tP of η
t.
Proof. Akin to the case of income transitions that are deterministic in ex-
pectation above, we define multiperiod expected income streams as g˜T (y) ≡∑T
t=0 δ
tf˜ (t) (y). By the Lemma in the last proof, g˜T+1 generates (weakly) higher
demand for redistribution than g˜T so long as
f˜−(T+1)
(
E
[
f˜ (T+1) (y)
])
≥ f˜−(T )
(
E
[
f˜ (T ) (y)
])
,
which is to say exactly when E
[
f˜ (T+1) (y)
]
≥ ηT
(
E
[
f˜ (T ) (y)
])
, which we will
show holds. Defining the lower envelope of ηT as ηT , since µT = E
[
f˜ (T ) (y)
]
,
by assumption
ηT
(
E
[
f˜ (T ) (y)
])
= ηT
(
E
[
f˜ (T ) (y)
])
. ηT is convex by construction so by
Jensen’s inequality,
ηT
(
E
[
f˜ (T ) (y)
])
≤ E
[
ηT ◦ f˜ (T ) (y)
]
= E
[
f˜ (T+1) (y)
]
.
Putting these equations together, E
[
f˜ (T+1) (y)
]
≥ ηT
(
E
[
f˜ (T ) (y)
])
, so by
the above condition, each increase in policy longevity increases the demand for
redistribution. The other claim follows similarly. 
3.5. Income Dynamics under Imperfect Information
Our analysis so far has assumed that voters know the true income transi-
tion function and use this knowledge to construct their forward looking income
24We additionally assume standard measurability and boundedness assumptions, e.g.
supθ,t Ey
[
f (t) (y, θ)
]
< ∞, so that the definitions of the discussion above are well defined
in this setting.
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forecasts and vote accordingly. We now relax this assumption by considering
the role of voters’ beliefs, which though informed by experience, may reflect
ideological priors rather than incumbent economic conditions.
To keep this problem manageable, we assume voters face a known family
of possible expected income transition functions {fλ (y)}λ∈[0,1] indexed by the
parameter λ. The family of income transitions is assumed to be bracketed by
two extreme specifications, one representing a right perspective or vision of
how the economy operates fR (at λ = 1) and the other a left perspective fL
(λ = 0). Specifically, the right perspective is that the laissez faire economy offers
substantial prospects of upward mobility such that voters need not support
redistributive policies. In contrast, the left perspective is that the economy
intrinsically offers few prospects for upward mobility, requiring redistributive
policies if significant fractions of the electorate are to get ahead economically.
We refer to these specifications as “ideologies,” using this word to denote a model
or understanding of how the world works.
At any point in time t, the individual’s understanding of the economy can
be represented by a probability density piit(λ) over possible values of λ while
the true value of λ, labeled λ0, is unknown to the individual. Note that this
specification naturally describes someone with a left view of the world as placing
a large probability weight on low or left values of λ, whereas a right view of the
world would have probability weight near the right side of the spectrum or 1.
We normalize the true value of state of the world λ0 to be 1/2. This specification
of how voters predict their future income under incomplete information will be
incorporated into our model of forward-looking voters. However, we first con-
sider how the critical new element, the voter’s probability distribution piit (λ),
is formed and evolves over time.
Each voter i begins with a prior distribution pii0 (λ) over possible values of
λ. We also assume that voters keep track of their idiosyncratic income histories
Hit ≡ {yi0, . . . , yit}. The history Hit is used to update beliefs each period to
a posterior belief piit (λ|Hit) according to Bayes rule. In our context, we can
think of pii0 (λ) as the initial ideological beliefs a voter has about the income
transitions they face, while piit (λ|Hit) are the voter’s new ideological beliefs
after t periods of learning about the true income dynamic. In order to make
this learning process concrete, we will analyze it assuming an explicit structure
of the transient income shocks specified in Assumption 1:
Assumption 1. The income dynamic each voter faces satisfies the following:
1. The shock it is distributed Uniform (1− σ, 1 + σ) for some σ ∈ (0, 1).25
2. Voters know the value of σ.
25The distributional form of it is not crucial, since the driving force for voting is conver-
gence through learning to a tight posterior around the true income transition state. Other
distributions give similar results, but induce updating rules that include weights from it for
each voter history that increase computational dimensionality.
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Recalling the true state of the world is λ0 = 1/2, actual incomes are yit =
f
(t)
1/2 (yi0) · it, so voters receive some random fraction, it, of their true expected
income. Under Assumption 1, the magnitude of σ determines whether fluctu-
ations around the expected value are large or small, with a larger σ obscuring
the true income dynamic from voters.
Now consider how voters update their beliefs under Assumption 1. Since
for any true state of the world λ, it = yit/f
(t)
λ (yi0) and each voter knows that
|it − 1| ≤ σ, voters know ∣∣∣yit/f (t)λ (yi0)− 1∣∣∣ ≤ σ. (6)
Equation (6) encapsulates the fact that a voter knows that realized income
yit must be within the fraction σ of expected income f
(t)
λ (yi0). Therefore any
state λ for which Equation (6) fails to hold cannot correspond to the true income
dynamic. Eliminating these impossible states is exactly what Bayes rule dictates
as the updating rule. Accordingly, piit (λ|Hit) is exactly pii0 (λ) restricted to all
values of λ that satisfy (6) for the voter’s history Hit, normalized to integrate
to one.
Appendix AppendixC develops the mechanics of learning dynamics in more
detail. Under imperfect information, voting behavior is determined by each
voter’s beliefs given their income history and the expected redistributive transfer
for each state of the world λ. A myopic voter (looking forward only one period)
prefers redistribution in period t when he believes expected transfers are positive:∫ 1
0
[
(1−D)
∫
f
(t+1)
λ (y) dF0 (y)− f (t+1)λ (yi0)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Transfer|λ,yi0
·
[
piit (λ|Hit)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Beliefs|Hit
dλ ≥ 0.
This expression naturally generalizes to the case when policies persist and voters
look forward by more than one period. As this expression makes clear, evolving
voter beliefs inserts another dynamic element into the determination of political
preferences.
3.6. Dead Weight Loss and the Amplification of Political Volatility
In the model of Bayesian voters faced with imperfect information just dis-
cussed, dead weight loss (D) can have a surprising role in generating potentially
radical political swings. At first glance, one might think that dead weight loss
would uniformly depress the demand for redistribution, but would have no effect
on its volatility. But under modest additional assumptions, this section shows
that increases in D can amplify political volatility. As this section will show,
this systematic effect results from the asymmetric effect that an increase in D
has on a Right partisan with a strong belief in fR in comparison to a Left par-
tisan with a strong belief in fL. Increases in D attrit support for redistribution
much faster for a Right partisan than for a Left partisan, creating a wider gulf
to cross as voters learn. As individuals learn and their beliefs move away from
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fR, their sensitivity to dead weight losses evaporates, powering a rapid shift in
the population’s support for redistributive policies. Dead weight loss can thus
amplify our core result on left-right political volatility when voters are learning
about a NoPOUM income dynamic.
In order to formalize this idea, let y˜R = f−1R ((1−D) E0 [fR]) denote the
income level of a voter who is indifferent about a single period of redistribu-
tion under fR, and similarly let y˜L = f−1L ((1−D) E0 [fL]) denote the income
of a voter who is indifferent under fL. By definition, the fraction of voters
preferring redistribution under fL is F0 (y˜L) while under fR the fraction is
F0 (y˜R). The gap between these two fractions, F0 (y˜L)− F0 (y˜R), is completely
accounted for by the range of possible beliefs held by voters, and quantifies
potential political volatility. Under plausible assumptions, we will show that
∂ [F0 (y˜L)− F0 (y˜R)] /∂D > 0. Direct manipulation shows this inequality is
equivalent to Equation (7):
(F ′0 (y˜L) /F
′
0 (y˜R)) · (E0 [fL] /E0 [fR]) < (f ′L (y˜L) /f ′R (y˜R)) (7)
We will verify this inequality as we detail the assumptions under which it holds.
The first additional assumption required for the dead weight loss result con-
cerns the income distribution. It is a stylized fact of real world income distri-
butions that the median is below the mean. Similarly, most real world income
distributions are unimodal, and the mode typically occurs below the mean. It
follows that voters at or below this unique mode would likely vote for redistri-
bution, even allowing for substantial dead weight loss of redistribution. This is
Assumption 2:
Assumption 2. Voters at the unique mode of the income distribution prefer
redistribution under both fL and fR.
Our second additional assumption is that income transitions deserve the
labels of Right and Left, in that fL implies greater demand for redistribution
than fR, i.e. F0 (y˜L) > F0 (y˜R). This assumption may be satisfied in many
ways, not least by constructing a continuum of Right-Left income transitions
via the “more concave than” ordering of Benabou and Ok (2001). We therefore
assume that fR is no more pessimistic about average growth than fL, in that
E0 [fR] ≥ E0 [fL]. With reference to our particular construction of Right and
Left, E0 [fR] = E0 [fL]. This is Assumption 3:
Assumption 3. Left voters prefer more redistribution that Right voters. In
addition, average growth under the Right transition is at least as high as under
the Left transition.
So far, Assumptions ?? and ?? guarantee the left hand side of Equation (7)
is less than one. Assumption 3 directly implies E0 [fL] ≤ E0 [fR], and also that
y˜L > y˜R. Since the income distribution is unimodal, the density of the distri-
bution F ′0 is decreasing for all incomes above the mode. Since by Assumption 2
the incomes y˜L and y˜R are above the mode, it follows that F ′0 (y˜L) < F ′0 (y˜R).
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Figure 3: Changes in Right vs Left Income as Dead Weight Loss Increases
Putting these together, we see (7) holds so long as f ′R (y˜R) ≤ f ′L (y˜L). Figure
3 makes this intuitive through a graphical analysis, which is a natural conse-
quence of modeling Right and Left transitions in terms of curvature. This is
Assumption 4:
Assumption 4. At the income levels where Right and Left voters are (respec-
tively) indifferent about redistribution, Left income is increasing faster than
Right income.
In order to explain Assumption 4, we depict idealized transitions fR and
fL in Figure 3. This figure supposes fR is concave while fL is convex, which is
approximately true when fR and fL are constructed as described above. Fix any
future mean income µ above median income, and consider the level of support
for redistribution next period as dead weight loss D increases, depicted in Figure
3 as a shift in the horizontal line µ to (1−D)µ. As dead weight loss increases,
the fraction of the population supporting redistribution decreases under both
fR and fL. Under fR, this decrease is from F0
(
f−1R (µ)
)
to F0
(
f−1R ([1−D]µ)
)
which in Figure 3 is larger than the drop in support under fL, from F0
(
f−1L (µ)
)
to F0
(
f−1L ([1−D]µ)
)
. This asymmetric effect of dead weight loss holds because
in the illustrated range, the concavity of fR implies fR is much flatter than
fL, which is convex. A local characterization that fR is flatter than fL is
f ′R (y˜R) ≤ f ′L (y˜L), which is precisely Assumption 4 and ensures that Equation
(7) holds.26 Formally:
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 2-4, the response of Right voters to dead
weight loss is larger than the response of Left voters.
26This assumption is stronger than needed to achieve Equation (7). It can be relaxed to the
extent that average growth is higher under fR than fL or that incomes are more concentrated
at lower incomes, i.e. around y˜R compared to y˜L.
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Proposition 4 summarizes that when ideologies are modeled as income dy-
namics, Right voters intrinsically have more aversion to dead weight loss than
Left voters. Dead weight loss further polarizes support for redistribution be-
tween Right and Left, and when voters update their beliefs away from extreme
priors, the effect will be to accelerate right-left (or left-right) political swings
beyond what would happen in the absence of dead weight loss.
The next two sections quantify the political implications of this model based
on estimates of actual income dynamics. We explore whether the forward-
looking voter model, possibly augmented with Bayesian learning effects, can
explain the Latin American political dynamics discussed in Section 1 above. We
also explore whether dead weight loss amplifies these dynamics as hypothesized
here.
4. The Right-Left Political Shift in Latin America under Full Infor-
mation
The prior section has shown that political dynamics for forward looking vot-
ers will depend on both the income transition and the initial distribution of
income. This section asks if these two considerations can help us understand re-
cent electoral dynamics in Latin America. Building on the method of Shorrocks
and Wan (2008),27 we first recover income distributions for several periods,
and then use these to calibrate income transition functions as the basis for the
analysis of political dynamics in Chile and Peru.
4.1. Income Dynamics in Chile and Peru
The analysis here relies on income decile data from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and
The World Bank, 2011). We use this data to construct approximate income
distributions
{
Fˆt
}
for each period by fitting a monotone spline to recover each
distribution.28 In order to recover income dynamics fˆ (y), we consider all func-
tions which are composed of line segments spanning each income decile. Letting
β denote a vector of ten line slopes (one for each decile), we can write every
admissible income dynamic fˆ (y) as fβ (y) for some β. To calibrate fβ (y), we
make use of the identity that if Ft (y) is the distribution of expected incomes
E [yit], then
f (t) (y) =F−1t ◦ F0 (y) (8)
27These authors use a parametric approach to back out income distributions from income
decile data. Synthetic income distributions generated by their method have surprising accu-
racy compared with known distributions.
28The SEDLAC income measures include monetary, non-monetary and transfer income in
addition to imputed rent, and we use the following country-year pairs: Chile (1994, 1996,
1998, 2000, 2003, 2006) and Peru (1997-2006).
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which fixes the relationship between the annual distribution of income Ft(y) and
the true income dynamic f(y).29 Equation (8) combined with estimates of the
income distribution each period, say
{
Fˆt
}
, provides a basis to calibrate fβ (y)
since Equation (8) implies f (t)β (y) ≈ Fˆ−1t ◦ Fˆ0 (y) for each observed period t.
Using these relationships, we then fit fβ(y) to best explain the recovered
income distributions for each observed year,
{
Fˆt
}
. To do this, we assume
Fˆ−1t ◦ Fˆ0(y) = f (t)β (y) ·(y) with the error term (y) distributed lognormal (0, σ).
This implies that for each y, Fˆ−1t ◦ Fˆ0(y) is distributed lognormal
(
f
(t)
β (y), σ
)
.
Taking our cue from maximum likelihood estimation, let φ(y, µ, σ) denote the
log normal likelihood for an observation y. We then maximize the log likelihood
summed across all years and incomes by finding β and σ to solve (9), with
further details in the Appendix:
max
β,σ
∑
t observed
∫
lnφ
(
y, f
(t)
β (y), σ
)
dF0(y). (9)
Having calibrated fβ(y) to recover income dynamics fˆ(y) for Chile and Peru,
we present the results graphically in Figure 4. A benchmark of ten years is il-
lustrated as this roughly corresponds to two presidential election cycles in Latin
American countries. Thus Figure 4 shows the calibrated income dynamic over
ten years (fˆ (10)) for each country, with a 95% confidence band illustrated in
dashed lines. For both countries, the interval estimates are wide, signaling that
it is difficult to precisely recover income dynamics, both for us as econometri-
cians and presumably also for those individuals who were living that experience.
In Section 5, we will explicitly model how noise in the income distribution pro-
cess affects voters’ ability to learn about income dynamics. For the remainder
of this section, we will treat the estimated dynamic patterns as known and use
these patterns to draw out the implications of the forward-looking voting model.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the expected income dynamics for Peru show
areas of convexity for much of the income distribution and therefore exhibit No-
POUM dynamics. In particular, note that those who begin in the lowest five
deciles are predicted to converge towards the initial median income level. Those
who begin from about the sixtieth to the eighty-fifth percentiles converge to an
intermediate income position equivalent to the starting level of the seventy-fifth
percentile, while those who begin above the eighty-fifth percentile grow rapidly
towards ever higher income levels. In contrast, the income dynamics for Chile
show prospects for absolute, if not relative, mobility for all deciles of the income
29To see this identity, note that inverting both sides of f (t)(y) = F−1t ◦ F0(y) shows F−10 ◦
Ft(y) = f (−t)(y), and
Ft(y) = Pr (yit ≤ y) = Pr
(
f (t)(yi0) ≤ y
)
= Pr
(
yi0 ≤ f (−t)(y)
)
= F0
(
f (−t)(y)
)
.
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Figure 4: Calibrated Income Transition Functions
(a) Chile 10-year Transition (b) Peru 10-year Transition
distribution.
4.2. Implied Political Dynamics Under Full Information
Using the recovered income transition functions for Peru and Chile, we now
derive the electoral dynamics implied by our model of voters who possess full
information on the underlying income transition process. We consider the his-
torical time period covered by our income decile data (mid-1990s to the mid-
2000s) and consider policy longevities (degrees of forward-lookingness) of 1 to
10 years. Computing the demand for redistribution across time and for varying
policy lengths then follows the development above. At any point in historical
time, H, and for any degree of policy longevity, T , we calculate the fraction of
the electorate supporting different policies as implied by our model:
Pr (Voter prefers τ = 1)= F˜H
([
gˆT
]−1 (
µˆT
))
(Forward Demand for Redistribution)
where gˆT (yi0) ≡
∑T
t=0 δ
tfˆ (t)(yi0), µˆT ≡ E0
[
gˆT (yi0)
]
and F˜H (y) ≡ Fˆ0◦fˆ (−H) (y).
Figure 5 graphs the results of these calculations for Chile and Peru under
the assumptions that redistribution incurs no dead weight loss (D = 0) and
that δ = .95. First, consider the myopic (T = 1) demand for redistribution
in each country. Over time, Chile shows a fairly linear pattern in Figure 4(a),
which implies fairly flat redistributive preferences over the period as calculated
in Figure 5(a). In contrast, reflecting the non-concavities in its calibrated income
dynamics, Peru shows a pattern in which the myopic demand for redistribution
increases over time.
Figure 5 also allows us to see what happens over time when voters are
forward-looking (and as policy longevity increases). In the case of Chile, more
forward-looking voters and longer-lasting policies barely perturbs the demand
for redistribution at any point in time. Peru again presents an interesting picture
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Figure 5: Evolving Demand for Redistribution
(a) % Demanding Redistribution: Chile (b) % Demanding Redistribution: Peru
as more forward-looking voters support redistribution more strongly than do
myopic voters, increasingly so over historical time.
While the contrast between Chile and Peru illustrates the importance of in-
come transition dynamics for political dynamics, the calculated level of support
for redistribution is remarkable high for both countries, in all time periods and
under any degree of forward-lookingness. Put differently, the full information
voter model predicts that there would have been strong support for redistribu-
tive policies long before such support actually emerged. While there are many
possible explanations for the tardy arrival of support for more aggressively re-
distributive policies, one is that voters perceived significant dead weight losses
to redistribution. To explore this idea, we calculate the level of dead weight
taxation loss that would have been necessary to provide majoritarian support
for laissez faire policies in Chile and Peru under the assumptions used to gen-
erate Figure 5. These levels are 45-48% in Chile and 43-47% in Peru, and are
exceedingly high in comparison to existing estimates of dead weight loss (e.g.
Olken (2006)), making it unlikely that dead weight losses explain the mismatch
between model prediction and reality.
5. The Right-Left Political Shift in Latin America Under Uncertainty
While the analysis so far is consistent with the left turn that took place in
Latin America politics, it cannot account for the timing of that shift, throwing
into sharp relief the question as to why so many voted for largely laissez faire
policies prior to the early part of this century. The answer cannot be found
in the prospect of upward mobility as the recovered income transitions suggest
that there were not prospects of upward mobility for important segments of the
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electorate. Indeed, forward-looking pocketbook voters with perfect information
on the nature of income dynamics would have supported redistributive policies
sooner and more forcefully than they actually did.
This section employs the imperfect information model of forward-looking,
Bayesian voters to analyze the right to left political shift observed across con-
temporary Latin America. To do this, we first provide an empirically grounded
approach for representing left and right political ideologies. Second, we argue
that economic crises of the 1980s put the left in disarray, and at the time of
reforms, voters adopted a POUM prior, since prior crises left no credible alter-
native to the emergent neoliberal model. Applying these assumptions to Peru,
we show that over the course of a dozen years, voter learning would generate a
22 percentage point increase in the fraction of the electorate preferring redistri-
bution, assuming that there is a zero dead weight loss associated with redistri-
bution. The electoral shift jumps to 27 percentage points when redistribution
carries a 10% dead weight loss. In both cases, those preferring redistribution
move from a minority to a majority of the population. While the exact shift in
the electorate will vary with how learning is modeled, the magnitude we find
highlights this mechanism as viable explanation of observed shifts in contrast
to a model of fully informed voters.
5.1. Empirical Approximation of Left and Right Ideologies
In order to arrive at plausible left and right ideological models of income
dynamics, we construct two functions (fR and fL) that surround and exaggerate
the true empirical income transition function, fˆ(y). We begin by characterizing
the right income transition model as one that offers greater prospects for upward
mobility and implies less demand for redistribution than does fˆ . For a given
fR, we then residually construct fL so that the true function can be expressed
as a linear combination of the left and right ideologies as specified in Equation
(10):
fλ(y) = (1− λ)fL(y) + λfR(y). (10)
We now describe the construction of fR and fL from the empirical income
transition fˆ(y). First define f(y), the upper envelope of fˆ(y) (which is neces-
sarily concave, thereby inducing POUM dynamics). Now consider the income
transition C(y) ≡ f(y) − κ · y where κ ≡ E [f(y)] /E [y]. C(y) has the same
curvature as f(y) since C ′′(y) = f
′′
(y), yet implies no change in mean income as
E [C(y)] = E
[
f(y)
]−E [κ · y] = 0. We conceptualize the “Right Ideology” fR(y)
by adding a multiple of C(y) to the empirical income transition fˆ(y) and sub-
tracting the same multiple from fˆ(y) to arrive at the “Left Ideology” fL(y). We
denote the constant that multiplies C(y) by ρ, giving the following expressions
for fR(y) and fL(y):
fR(y) ≡ fˆ(y) + ρ
[
f(y)− κ · y] , fL(y) ≡ fˆ(y)− ρ [f(y)− κ · y] . (11)
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Figure 6: Stylized Right and Left Income Ideologies
(a) Chile (b) Peru
Therefore, combining Equations (10) and (11), we have
fλ(y) = fˆ(y) + (2λ− 1) ρ
[
f(y)− κ · y] .
Increases in the constant ρ decrease the demand for redistribution under fR(y),
in line with the intuition that as ρ increases, more of the curvature from f(y)
is present in fR.
Figure 6 illustrates the application of this approach of constructing fR(y) and
fL(y) in Chile and Peru. The uppermost curve is fR(y), representing the effect of
adding the curvature term ρ ·C(y) to f(y), while the bottom curve is fL(y) with
the same term ρ · C(y) subtracted from f(y). Referring back to Equation (11),
the parameter ρ determines the spectrum of possible income transitions between
fR(y) and fL(y) by making both of these bounding transitions more extreme.
Using the empirical income transition functions of Figure 4, we fix the constant
ρ to be the large as possible to capture the widest range of possibilities, subject
to the constraint that both fR(y) and fL(y) are increasing. These maximal
values of ρ are 28.4 (Chile) and 43.2 (Peru). While these values for ρ may seem
large, any values used should allow for a large degree of ignorance about actual
income dynamics. In any case, we next introduce Bayesian learning dynamics,
so that beliefs in these maximal values of ρ will be adjusted in line with voters’
observed income dynamics.
5.2. Learning and Political Dynamics under a POUM Prior
The final element needed is a specification of voters’ initial beliefs about in-
come dynamics at the beginning of the 1990s. To illustrate the implications of
our model, we take seriously the then common observation that there was an ex-
haustion of credible political alternatives to a liberal economic regime. As Mar-
garet Thatcher famously intoned: “TINA–There Is No Alternative” to free mar-
kets. Thatcher’s statements motivate what we call the TINA or POUM prior,
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Figure 7: Demand for a 10 Year Redistributive Policy by Income Percentile
(a) Peru: Year 0 (b) Peru: Year 6 (c) Peru: Year 12
meaning an initial set of beliefs, pii0(λ), that heavily weight the right perspective
on the income process and its promise of upward mobility. In the numerical anal-
ysis that follows, we use a simple prior form which places exponential weight on
Right beliefs for voters in the initial period, namely pii0(λ) = 10e10λ/
(
e10 − 1).
Although this is one particular prior, the results are fairly robust to any prior
highly weighted to the Right ideology.
With the POUM prior in hand, and the empirically grounded representations
of Left and Right ideologies in Figure 6, we now numerically simulate political
dynamics in Chile and Peru, assuming an idiosyncratic income shock parameter
σ = 1/2, and that voters look forward ten years and have a discount rate of
95%.30 Figure 7 shows the simulated evolution of political preferences for Peru
in the initial period, six years later and twelve years later. The y-axis shows
the percentage of the electorate preferring redistribution by income percentile.
The solid line in each figure is the full information benchmark, showing what
political preferences would have looked like had voters had perfect information
on the true income dynamic. The dashed line shows political preferences by
decile under imperfect information (and when voters begin with the POUM
prior) and when there are no dead weight losses associated with redistribution.
The dotted line shows the same imperfect information scenario but assumes
that redistribution is associated with a 10% dead weight loss.31
As can be seen, the preferences of fully and imperfectly informed voters are
quite different, although absent any dead weight loss the median voter would
have preferred redistribution from the outset. However, with a 10% dead weight
30Necessarily, the variance recovered from our fitting of income transitions to country decile
data is a lower bound for the variance of idiosyncratic income shocks, since the decile data has
been aggregated across individuals. σ = 1/2 satisfies this lower bound and is close to known
estimates: see Musgrove (1979).
31Given the new insights above regarding the asymmetric effect of dead weight loss on Right
versus Left voters, modeling uncertainty about dead weight loss (e.g. Roemer (1994)) could
produce even larger swings in the electorate.
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loss, the median, forward-looking voter would have initially voted against redis-
tribution under the TINA prior.32 However, after six years of living and learning
from the actual income distribution process, the median voter, and most voters
in the lowest seven deciles of the income distribution would have favored redis-
tributive policies. After a dozen years, the preferences of most voters approach
those that would hold under full information, implying a major political shift
from minority to majority support for redistribution.
Figure 8 provides another look at the political dynamics implied by our
model. The vertical axis now displays the fraction of the electorate at each
point in time that is expected to vote for redistribution. Absent dead weight
losses, over the 1997 to 2009 simulation period in Peru, the fraction voting for
redistribution rises by some 22 percentage points, again approaching the levels
that would be expected under full information by 2010. With dead weight losses,
politics become even more volatile with a 27% shift over this 12-year period.33
These sharp swings in policy preferences are largely driven by swing voters’
reevaluation of their prospects for upward mobility as they learn from the actual
operation of the Peruvian economy. An interesting contrast to these results is
provided by undertaking a similar exercise for the Chilean economy. The es-
timated Chilean income transition function of Figure 6(a) is one that shows
absolute upward income mobility for all classes, though not much relative im-
provement for the initially lower income deciles. While simulated preferences
for redistribution in the Chilean case are strong, they remain quite stable over
time, offering a vision of much more stable politics in Chile than in a country
with a polarizing income distribution process.
6. Conclusion
Adopting the perspective that voters are forward-looking and pay attention
to income dynamics, not just to their place in the contemporaneous income
distribution, this paper has explored the right to left shift in the politics of Latin
American countries over the last twenty-five years. Two analytical innovations
are key to this exploration. The first is a generalization of earlier work on
forward-looking voters. We here model political preferences under families of
income distribution dynamics beyond concave dynamics that offer prospects
of upward mobility. This generalization, motivated by empirical evidence of
polarizing, non-concave dynamics that offer no prospects of upward mobility
for segments of the population, shows that preferences for redistributive policies
may increase, not decrease over time when voters are forward-looking. The key
32It is difficult to ascertain what the level of dead weight loss is for these countries for this
period. As a benchmark, Olken (2006) estimates a dead weight loss of redistribution of 18%
in Indonesia. As higher levels of dead weight loss amplify our results (as shown theoretically
above), we have chosen a conservative assumption of 10%.
33This perhaps counterintuitive result is consistent with Proposition ?? above, although we
have not specifically calibrated this section’s simulation analysis to match the assumptions
under which we have shown this proposition to be true.
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Figure 8: Aggregate Demand for a 10 Year Redistributive Policy
(a) Chile (b) Peru
message is that unlike a world which offers upward mobility to low income voters,
the dynamics of demand for redistribution are not a foregone conclusion and may
manifest in volatile political patterns. This points to evaluating the relationship
between income dynamics and political choices in light of the conditions voters
face on a country-specific basis.
However, detailed analysis of the case of Peru suggests that there would have
been initially strong support for redistribution had voters been fully informed
about the nature of the income distribution dynamics, making it extremely hard
to account for the elections in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America in the 1990s
that brought conservative candidates to power. Indeed, the Latinobarómetro
public opinion data discussed in Section 1 shows that the high point of support
for conservative policy in the mid-1990s was marked by extremely high prospects
of self-reported upward mobility.
These observations motivate this paper’s second innovation, namely its mod-
eling of voters as Bayesian learners who update their understanding of income
distribution dynamics based on their own lived experience. Given that most
voters in Peru (and other countries which saw a transition to a market economy
in the late 1980s and early 1990s) had little prior experience with the new eco-
nomic model, we assume that they initially adopted a prior probability distribu-
tion that put substantial weight on an ideological position that attached strong
prospects for upward mobility to the region’s new economic model. While this
assumption is admittedly strong, we find that learning rather quickly erases ide-
ological errors. Numerical simulation of political preferences as voters received
noisy draws from the true (calibrated) income distribution process shows that a
substantial shift from strong right political majority to a strong left political ma-
jority over the course of about a dozen years. Somewhat surprisingly, political
volatility is actually increased when the electorate believes that redistributive
policies carry dead weight losses. We show that the additional political volatil-
ity created by dead weight loss is to be expected under assumptions plausibly
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satisfied by real world data.
While there are of course competing explanations of the kinds of policy shifts
we explain with our voter learning model (see especially the work of Callander
(2011), Buera et al. (2011) and Weyland (2002) discussed in the Introduction
above), our theoretical model suggests a number of empirically testable implica-
tions about the nature of political change that may help to distinguish between
these alternative explanations. As is clear from our theoretical framework, a key
parameter that will influence the speed and acceleration of political dynamics is
the amount of noise in the income distribution process (σ, the variance of εit in
our notation). Exploration of these dynamics is beyond the scope of this paper,
but we hope that our theoretical framing motivates an agenda of empirical work
in this area.
Latin America of the 1990s is not only the region to have transitioned to
a market economy. While there can certainly be no claim that the precise
voting dynamics derived here for Peru apply to other countries, the information
deficit and voting dilemma confronted by the Peruvian electorate has had its
reflection in a much larger number of countries that have transitioned to political
democracy and market economies. Modeling the evolving political preferences
of voters in these regions as forward-looking, Bayesian learners offers insights
into the complex and often unstable voting patterns observed in these other
regions.
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AppendixA. Recovery of Simple Income Dynamics
As developed above, we fit a class of income transitions fβ(y) defined by
piecewise line segments spanning each income decile. Specifically, these line
segments span the midpoints between each income decile (with endpoints defined
by incomes at zero and twice the tenth income decile). The years used to
determine the midpoints are roughly in the middle of our data sample years:
2001 in Chile and 1998 in Peru. The values of β which maximize Equation (9) for
each country are reported in Table AppendixA.1, while the 95% confidence band
for incomes graphed in Figure 4 are based on the likelihood maximizing values
σPeru = 0.0943 and σChile = 0.0540. The parameter values of ρ and g which
determine Right and Left income transitions are ρChile = 28.42, ρPeru = 43.16
and κChile = 1.02, κPeru = 1.009.
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AppendixB. Dependence of redistributive demand on initial income
AppendixB.1. Fragility of Redistributive Dynamics
Consider an income distribution F0 composed of three equally sized groups
with incomes Y1, Y2, Y3 where 0 < Y1 < Y2 < Y3 < Y . Then µt =
∑
(1/3) ·
f (t)(Yi) and so clearly depends on the initial distribution of income F0 interact-
ing with the evolution of group incomes f (t)(Yi). Now also suppose f has three
fixed points YTrap < YEscape < Y where for y < YEscape, f
(t)(y) −→ YTrap
and for y > YEscape, f
(t)(y) −→ Y . In this case all groups are going to ei-
ther YTrap or Y . To fix ideas, assume Y1 < YEscape < Y3 so the Y1 group
converges to YTrap while Y3 converges to Y . Clearly Y1 prefers the complete
redistribution scheme r1 while Y3 prefers r0. This leaves open the middle class
of “swing voters” Y2. If Y2 > YEscape then the middle class eventually climbs
the income ladder to Y and joins the (now majoritarian) voting block of Y3.
Otherwise, if Y2 < YEscape there is a thinning of the middle class and swing
voters eventually join with Y1, implying the median voter prefers redistribution.
Note the fragility of the eventual voting outcomes: a small income difference δ in
Y2 can push Y2 + δ to be greater or less than YEscape. This eventually results
in a large fraction p2 of swing voters to switch their vote as income evolves.
Similar consequences can arise if voters lack perfect information about F0 or f
so that small changes in beliefs can give rise to large changes in redistributive
preferences.
AppendixB.2. The Same Income Transition Often Can Imply Both Increase and
Decreasing Redistributive Demand
A broad class of dynamics can exhibit either increasing or decreasing de-
mand for redistribution. The deciding factor for redistributive dynamics, even
for a fixed dynamic, is the initial distribution of income. This emphasizes the
interrelationship between “Upward/No Mobility” in the dynamic role of income
transitions and the “existing order” in the role of the income distribution: po-
litical implications cannot be drawn without considering both:
Proposition. Suppose f is bounded and define f (∞)(y) ≡ limt−→∞ f (t)(y)
as an individual’s income after an arbitrarily long period of time. Let µ∞ be the
least possible per capita income under f (∞) and let µ∞ be the highest possible
per capita income under f (∞).
1. (POUM Forever) If
[
µ∞, µ∞
]
intersects the interior of YP, there is an
initial distribution of income where the demand for redistribution always
decreases.
2. (No-POUM Forever) If
[
µ∞, µ∞
]
intersects the interior of YN there is an
initial distribution of income where the demand for redistribution always
increases.
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Proof. Formally, we have µ∞ ≡ infF0
∫
f (∞)dF0 and µ∞ ≡ supF0
∫
f (∞)dF0
where the infimum and supremum are taken over bounded, absolutely continu-
ous initial income distributions. µ∞ and µ∞ are both in [0,∞) as for any fixed
F0, f is bounded so
∫
f (∞)dF0 = limt−→∞
∫
f (t)dF0 by bounded convergence,
and clearly each
∫
f (t)dF0 ∈ [0, sup f ]. We will consider the POUM case as the
other case is similar. By hypothesis, there is some µ∗ ∈
[
µ∞, µ∞
]
and an open
set V such that µ∗ ∈ V ⊂ YP. Fix  > 0 such that µ∗ ±  ∈ V and fix λ such
that µ∗ = λµ∞ + (1− λ)µ∞ (note this forces λ ∈ [0, 1]). Now define, for any
initial income distribution G, µGt ≡
∫
f (t)dG. By definition of µ∞ and µ∞ we
may choose initial income distributions F and F where
lim
t−→∞µ
F
t < µ∞ +
/2 and lim
t−→∞µ
F
t > µ∞ − /2.
It follows that there is a T such that for all t ≥ T , µFt < µ∞+ and µFt > µ∞−.
This implies
∣∣∣λµFt + (1− λ)µFt − [λµ∞ + (1− λ)µ∞]∣∣∣ <  for all t ≥ T . Since
λµ∞+(1− λ)µ∞ = µ∗ and F˜ ≡ λF +(1− λ)F is an admissible initial income
distribution, we see
∣∣∣µF˜t − µ∗∣∣∣ <  for all t ≥ T . By construction, this implies
µF˜t ∈ V ⊂ YP, so by Proposition 1, the demand for redistribution is always
decreasing when the initial distribution of income is F0(y) ≡ F˜ (f (T )(y)). 
AppendixC. Demand for Redistribution under Imperfect Informa-
tion
In general, neither fL nor fR need reflect reality but rather idealized versions
of what Left and Right ideologues might represent in a manifesto. Clearly the
relative strength of a voter’s beliefs in these world views will influence voting
behavior. In order to emphasize the role of beliefs piit(λ|Hit) in deriving a voter’s
expected income, we now illustrate the decisions of a pocketbook voter who is
also a Bayesian learner.
If a voter knows the true value of λ, namely λ0, then beliefs pii0(λ) put a point
mass of 1 on λ0. This is the perfect information case, and as above expected
income in period 1 would be given by E[yi1|Hi0, pii0] = fλ0(yi0). However, each
voter does not know λ0 with certainty but has a non-degenerate prior density
pii0(λ) over possible values of λ. Now consider a voter in period 0 with income
yi0. The voter’s expected income in period 1 is a weighted average of expected
income over plausible values of λ, namely E[yi1|Hi0, λ = λ0] = fλ(yi0) weighted
by pii0(λ). Specifically,
E[yi1|Hi0, pii0] =
∫ 1
0
E[yi1|Hi0, λ]pii0(λ)dλ =
∫ 1
0
fλ(yi0)pii0(λ)dλ.
More generally, at the end of periods 1 to t, a voter updates his prior pii0(λ)
to a posterior piit(λ) using their history Hit = {yi0, . . . yit}. Therefore expected
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income in period t+ 1 is
E[yit+1|Hit, pii0] =
∫
f
(t+1)
λ (yi0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Income|λ
· piit(λ|Hit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
History Dependent Beliefs Over λ
dλ. (C.1)
Equation (C.1) highlights the two dynamic factors which influence a voter’s
beliefs about expected income. The first element, expected income given λ is
the true state of the world, is deterministic as under perfect information. The
second element, a voter’s ideological beliefs, evolve as information is collected
in the form of the idiosyncratic income history Hit.
Since each possible value of λ corresponds to an economy wide income dy-
namic, a voter’s beliefs also impact expectations about mean income next pe-
riod. Given that fλ is the true income dynamic, mean income in period t+1 is
µt+1|λ ≡
∫
f
(t+1)
λ (y)dF (y). Thus, a voter with an income history Hit and prior
pii0 believes mean income in period t+ 1 is
E[µt+1|Hit, pii0] =
∫ 1
0
[µt+1|λ] · piit(λ|Hit)dλ
=
∫ 1
0
[∫
f
(t+1)
λ (y)dF (y)
]
piit(λ|Hit)dλ. (C.2)
After accounting for any dead weight loss D, a voter will prefer redistribution
if and only if E[(1−D)µt+1|Hit, pii0] ≥ E[yit+1|Hit, pii0]. From Equations (C.1)
and (C.2) this means voters prefer redistribution when∫ 1
0
[
(1−D)
∫
f
(t+1)
λ (y)dF (y)− f (t+1)λ (yi0)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Transfer|λ
·piit(λ|Hit)dλ ≥ 0. (C.3)
Equation (C.3) shows that a voter prefers redistribution when, given their his-
tory Hit, they believe the expected transfer from redistribution will be positive.
Note that two voters with the same initial incomes need not have the same re-
distributive preferences: whether Equation (C.3) holds depends on each voter’s
income history through their beliefs piit(λ|Hit). This implies the popularity of
redistributive policies varies in a nontrivial way across initial incomes. Preferred
policies for each voter over redistribution in period t + 1, conditional on their
history Hit, are summarized as
Prefer Redistribution:
∫ [
(1−D)µt+1|λ− f (t+1)λ (yi0)
]
piit(λ|Hit)dλ ≥ 0,
Prefer Laissez Faire:
∫ [
(1−D)µt+1|λ− f (t+1)λ (yi0)
]
piit(λ|Hit)dλ ≤ 0.
A clear connection from ideological beliefs to demand for redistribution is given
by:
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Assumption 5. Increases in λ imply expected income improves relative to trans-
fers
(df (t)λ (yi0)/dλ ≥ d (1−D)µt|λ/dλ) for all swing voters defined as yi0 where
yi0 ∈
[
f
(−t)
R ((1−D)µt|λ = 1) , f (−t)L ((1−D)µt|λ = 0)
]
(Swing Voters)
This Assumption says that as λ increases (moves to the Right), each voter
believes his expected income f (t)λ (yi0) increases relatively more than expected
transfers (1−D)µt|λ. Furthermore, we only require this to hold for voters who
might potentially change their vote: the votes of both destitute (f (t)λ (yi0) <
(1−D)µt|λ for all λ) and well-to-do (f (t)λ (yi0) > (1−D)µt|λ for all λ) are
unaffected by belief. Crucially, the expected transfer (1−D)µt|λ− f (t)λ (yi0) is
decreasing in λ. It follows that voter j tends to prefer less redistribution than
voter i when voter j’s beliefs pijt are “to the Right” of a voter i’s beliefs piit.
To make this precise, assume that pij stochastically dominates pii and i and j
have the same initial incomes. Since for each fixed λ, (1−D)µt|λ− f (t)λ (yi0) =
(1−D)µt|λ − f (t)λ (yj0) and this equation is decreasing in λ, the dominance of
pij over pii implies∫ [
(1−D)µt|λ− f (t)λ (yj0)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Transfer|λ
pijt(λ)dλ ≤
∫ [
(1−D)µt|λ− f (t)λ (yi0)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Transfer|λ
piit(λ)dλ
(C.4)
(C.4) shows that the “Right” voter j believes they will receive a lower net transfer
from redistribution than the “Left” voter i. Therefore voter j tends to prefers
less redistribution than voter i. This result is summarized as Proposition 5:
Proposition 5. Suppose the Assumption above holds. If voters i and j are
identical except voter j’s beliefs pijt stochastically dominate voter i’s beliefs piit,
then j prefers less redistribution than i.
Proposition 5 shows that the further to the ideological Right a voter is, the
less redistribution they prefer. In this framework, one would expect that the
speed of learning would be related to both the variability of income signals and
the gap between left and right predictions for an individual’s future income
position.34 These expectations imply a rich set of testable implications about
the evolution of political preferences and voting.
34Voters may of course learn about additional aspects of the economy besides income mo-
bility, which could influence political preferences. In particular, we have not modeled the
effect of learning the level of dead weight loss present in any prospective redistributive policy,
although Proposition 4 suggests the impact this added dimension would have.
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AppendixD. Proofs
Lemma 2. Suppose f and g are income transition functions. Then the myopic
demand for redistribution implied by the income transition f + g is between that
implied by f and g.
Proof. Formally, we wish to show that
(f + g)
−1
(E [f + g]) ∈ [f−1 (E [f ]) , g−1 (E [g])] . (D.1)
Since f and g are strictly increasing, composing each side with f+g shows (D.1)
holds iff
E [f ] + E [g] ∈ [E [f ] + g ◦ f−1 (E [f ]) ,E [g] + f ◦ g−1 (E [g])] . (D.2)
Subtracting E [f ] + E [g] from both sides of Equation (D.2) shows the equation
holds iff
0 ∈ [g ◦ f−1 (E [f ])− E [g] , f ◦ g−1 (E [g])− E [f ]] . (D.3)
This always holds, since considering the two terms on the RHS of (D.2) have
different signs, since
sign
{
g ◦ f−1 (E [f ])− E [g]} = sign{f−1 (E [f ])− g−1 (E [g])} ,
sign
{
f ◦ g−1 (E [g])− E [f ]} = sign{g−1 (E [g])− f−1 (E [f ])} .

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